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WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND GRADUAL STRESS IN
THE WORKPLACE
GLENN M. TROOSTt
As medical science's understanding of mental disorders has im-
proved,1 the relationship between stress and all kinds of disabilities,
both physical and mental, has become better understood. Researchers
have identified the workplace as a major source of stress,2 and courts
have with increasing frequency faced claims by disabled workers seek-
ing workers' compensation for alleged mental injuries. Although all
workers' compensation claims involving mental injuries have created
problems for the courts, the most troublesome cases involve psychiatric
illnesses or injuries that are claimed to result from the gradual effects of
everyday, on-the-job stress and anxiety.' This Comment focuses on the
t B.S. 1983, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate, 1986, University of Pennsylva-
nia. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
' See LaDou, Mulryan & McCarthy, Cumulative Injury or Disease Claims: An
Attempt to Define Employers' Liability for Workers' Compensation, 6 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1, 2-3 (1980); Marks, Defense of Psychiatric and Heart Claims Under Work-
men's Compensation, 30 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 289, 289-90 (1980). See generally
Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE
L.J. 1129 (1961) (examining existing doctrines underlying traditional workmen's com-
pensation statutes and the psychoanalytic theories increasingly used to support disabil-
ity payments for psychoneurotic disorders).
2 See, e.g., Pesci, Stress Management: Separating Myth from Reality, PERSONNEL
AD., Jan. 1982, at 57; Rice, Can Companies Kill?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, June 1981,
at 78; Selzer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56 COR-
NELL L. REV. 951 (1971); Waldholz, Stress Increasingly Seen as Problem, with Execu-
tives More Vulnerable, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 37, col. 6; Lublin, On-the-Job
Stress Leads Many Workers to File-and Win-Compensation Awards, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 17, 1980, at 33, col. 6.
' Generally, cases involving mental injuries can be divided into three categories:
(1) injuries caused by physical stimuli resulting in mental manifestations; (2) injuries
caused by mental stimuli resulting in physical manifestations; and (3) injuries caused
by mental stimuli resulting in mental manifestations. See 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 42.20-.24 (1982 & Supp. 1983); Larson, Mental and
Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1243, 1243 (1970);
Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REv. 288, 288 (1964).
They are commonly termed "physical-mental," "mental-physical," and "mental-
mental" claims, respectively. See, e.g, 1B A. LARSON, supra, § 42.23.
One may further divide mental-mental injuries into those caused by gradual or
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appropriate legal standard courts should apply when considering these
"gradual stress" claims.
Gradual-stress cases have posed serious problems for many courts
because they differ significantly from traditional workers' compensation
cases. In the past, courts relied upon the presence of a traumatic pre-
cipitating event and a physically evident disability to assure them that
the injury was both genuine and work-related. In a gradual-stress case,
however, such indicia are absent, and the courts have been forced to
fashion new tests in order to determine whether a mental injury is
work-related and thus compensable.
Two principal tests have emerged. Under the approach adopted by
a growing number of jurisdictions, an employee can recover workers'
compensation if she can demonstrate that her mental disorder was
caused by her workplace exposure to unusual, unexpected, or ex-
traordinary stress-pressures and tensions in the workplace that are
greater than those experienced by the average employee. Thus, under.
this "unusual stress" test, an employee's recovery depends not only on
whether gradual stress actually caused her injury, but also on whether
the stress she suffered differed from that experienced by her co-work-
ers. The competing test-the "objective causation" test-simply re-
quires the disabled worker to establish a causal connection between the
workplace and the mental injury; she need not establish that the stress
that caused the injury is unusual or extraordinary.
This Comment argues that the objective causation test is the more
appropriate test for determining whether workers alleging gradual-
stress injuries should receive benefits. This test is preferable for two
reasons. First, it is more consistent with the policies of comprehensive
coverage that animate workers' compensation statutes. Second, the un-
usual-stress test is predicated on a misguided view of causation, and
often will deny compensation to claimants whose injuries are in fact
work-related. The objective causation test assures that all disabled
workers receive compensation for their mental injuries while it also
provides adequate protection against fraudulent claims.
cumulative mental stimuli-chronic stress, for instance-and those caused by sudden or
traumatic mental stimuli, such as the witnessing of the violent death of a co-worker.
Although this distinction may be suspect for medical purposes, see Selzer, supra note 2,
at 952, 955 (arguing that continual emotional stress may be as traumatic as a distinct
mental shock), it is useful for analyzing judicial approaches to the concept of mental
injuries.
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I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL-STRESS CASES: THE
COMPETING TESTS
Most jurisdictions have workers' compensation statutes that their
courts have interpreted to compensate workers for mental injuries asso-
ciated with mental stimuli.4 In an effort to decide whether gradual-
stress injuries qualify as compensable mental injuries of this type, many
of these jurisdictions have developed two significantly different tests: the
unusual-stress test and the objective causal-connection test.
5
4 A number of jurisdictions whose compensation schemes have been held not to
reach gradual-stress injuries have allowed the same schemes to compensate sudden
mental-mental claims. See, e.g., Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18, 389 N.E.2d 83, 86
(1979) (stating that employee is entitled to compensation when she suffers mental dis-
order caused by series of identifiable, stressful, work-related incidents but not when
similar injury was the product of normal wear and tear); Estate of Babb v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 417 So. 2d 545, 550 (Miss. 1982) ("Workmen's Compensation Law in Mis-
sissippi . . . requires a physical injury or traumatic impact which results in the mental
condition."); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. 1979)
(barring recovery for mental disorder caused by nonphysical stimulus unless the disor-
der is "traceable to a definite time, place, and cause"). Most commentators agree, how-
ever, that the distinction between gradual and acute stress is unprincipled, both medi-
cally, see, e.g., Seizer, supra note 2, at 952-58, and legally, see, e.g, 1B A. LARSON,
supra note 3, § 42.23(b) (arguing that distinction is "unsound" since under compensa-
tion law, when injury "has some physical component, the protracted nature of the stim-
ulus has not been an obstacle to recovery").
5 A third test is the subjective causal-nexus test, adopted by Michigan in Deziel v.
Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978). The state supreme court
was faced with a worker in an automobile salvage department who, due to his hypo-
chondria, was disabled by an irrational worry that the cars being assembled were un-
safe, even though there was no objective evidence to substantiate that fear. The court
held that a claimant is entitled to compensation for a mental injury if she honestly
believes that an "injury incurred during the ordinary work of. . .employment 'caused'
[the] disability." Id. at 26, 268 N.W.2d at 11. Compensation would thus be allowed
even though the employee's subjective perception of the work environment as the cause
of her disability was in fact mistaken. See id. There need not be any causal connection
between the actual work conditions and the mental injury; the employee need only
honestly believe that she was disabled by a work-related injury.
Such a standard undoubtedly represents the worst nightmares of any judge who
fears that the compensation of gradual mental-mental cases will lead to a flood of
fraudulent claims. Indeed, the "honest perception" standard was recently questioned by
the Michigan Court of Appeals:
In view of the financial gain-sometimes very substantial-any person
who files a claim based on a psychiatric disorder will have strong motives
to lie about his perception. The question then becomes whether that per-
ception is "honest." . . . [Ulnder this loose standard for recovery, Michi-
gan employers are nearly becoming general health insurers for psychiatric
disabilities. This is an alarming possibility.
Bentley v. Associated Spring Co., 133 Mich. App. 15, 20-21, 347 N.W.2d 784, 786-87
(1984) (citation omitted). Other courts that are critical of this strictly subjective nexus
standard stress the importance of the work itself actually causing the injury:
We all know that stress may flow from work conditions. However, the on-
the-job stress conditions causing the disorders must be real. That is, the
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A. Unusual, Unexpected, or Extraordinary Stress Test
Of the states that have addressed gradual-stress cases, nine have
adopted some variation of a test that requires the claimant to establish
that her injury was the result of unusual, unexpected, or extraordinary
stress in the workplace.6 The approach taken by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations' is illustrative. In that case, the court held that
the concept of injury includes emotional stress without physical trauma
if the injury results from exposure to conditions or circumstances be-
events and conditions producing the stress must, from an objective stand-
point, exist in reality .... A worker's misperception of reality does not
flow from any factual work condition.
McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 164, 675 P.2d 159, 170
(1983).
In response to Deziel, the Michigan legislature amended the workers' compensa-
tion law to preclude compensation under a subjective standard. The amendment states
that "[m]ental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of
employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof." 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 357 (codified
at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 1984)). See Joseph, Causa-
tion in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: The Michigan Experience, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 1079, 1083-84 (1981).
6 The nine states are Arizona, Arkansas, Maine, Montana, New York, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n, 121
Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1978), Owens v. National Health Laboratories, Inc., 648
S.W.2d 829, 831 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that if psychological injury results from
"nontraumatically induced events . . . the worker must show more than the ordinary
day-to-day stress to which all workers are subjected"); Townsend v. Maine Bureau of
Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Me. 1979) (adopting dual test for gradual stress
whereby claimant may recover if she can either demonstrate that she "was subjected to
greater pressures and tensions than those experienced by the average employee or, al-
ternatively, by clear and convincing evidence show that the ordinary and usual work-
related pressure predominated in producing the injury"); Erhart v. Great W. Sugar
Co., 169 Mont. 375, 381, 546 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1976) (holding that nervous break-
down as a result of stress is compensable only if it is clearly attributable to an unusual
strain and a tangible happening, or series of happenings, of a traumatic nature); In re
Ottomanelli, 80 A.D.2d 688, 688, 436 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (App. Div. 1981) (holding
that butcher's work week, which consisted of five 12-hour days, constituted "prolonged,
unusual circumstances" that supported recovery in a mental-mental case); Rega v. Kai-
ser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 475 A.2d 213, 216 (R.I. 1984) (stating that employee
must prove that "mental injury and disability were caused by dramatically stressful
stimuli that were not ordinarily present and expected in the workplace"); Mayes v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 672 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that
recovery is available only when mental or nervous disorder results from "fright, shock
or even unexpected anxiety" that amounts to an "accident"); Swiss Colony, Inc. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 51, 240 N.W.2d
128, 130 (1976); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1984)
("[N]on-traumatically caused mental injury is compensable . . . if it results from a
situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day
mental stresses and tensions all employees usually experience.").
' 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
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yond those common to everyday worklife.8 The claimant in Swiss Col-
ony was a purchasing agent who suffered a schizophrenic breakdown
that was attributed to the nerve-wracking seasonal quality of her job
and the harassments of her supervisor. According to the court, "[I]n
order for a non-traumatically caused mental injury to be compensable
* . . [it] must have resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than
the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which all employees must
experience. ' 9
Phrased differently by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the un-
usual-stress test stands for the proposition that
''worry, anxiety or emotional stress of a general nature" are
not, in and of themselves, sufficient to establish an accident
[and] . ..that "injury by accident" does not embrace every
stress or strain of daily living or every undesirable experi-
ence encountered in carrying out the duties of a contract of
employment.1 0
Stated as such, this test is essentially evidentiary, for the stressors
present in the workplace must be so conspicuous that there is little
doubt in the court's mind that such stressors actually exist and that
they caused the claimant's injury. Indeed, the unusual-stress test's ap-
pealing quality seems to be that it treats gradual-stress injuries as if
they were caused by an event-its requirement that some "unexpected,
unusual, or extraordinary" occurrence take place is a search for dis-
crete, isolated incidents from which the tag of "causation" may be
hung.
B. Objective Causal-Connection Test
The objective causal-connection test is employed by nine jurisdic-
tions.11 The Oregon experience is representative. In 1983 Oregon's su-
8 See id. at 51, 240 N.W.2d at 130 (citing School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974)).
9 Id.
10 Matthews v. Industrial Maintenance Corp. (Tenn. June 11, 1984) (unpub-
lished opinion) (available Jan. 1985, on LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file) (quoting
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tenn. 1979)).
11 California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, and West Virginia have adopted some version of this test. See Baker v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 861, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286
(1971) (holding that psychoneurotic injuries resulting from the "cumulative effect of
each day's stresses and strains" are compensable); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor
& Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Hawaii 32, 38, 487 P.2d 278, 282 (1971) (holding
that an "employee suffers a work-related injury within the meaning of [the statute]
when he sustains a psychogenic disability precipitated by the circumstances of his em-
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preme court adopted the causal-connection test in McGarrah v. State
Accident Insurance Fund Corp."2 Acknowledging that "[t]he vast ma-
jority of workers, if not all, face and deal with job stress on a daily
basis,"1" the court held that it is only equitable that such stress, if ob-
jectively real, be recognized as a cause of compensable injuries.
1 4
The court, however, was mindful of the caution necessitated by
such a broad approach, and it articulated a two-part test. First,
[tihe stressful conditions must actually exist on the job. That
is, they must be real, and not imaginary. The views of an
average worker or average person or the perceptions by the
claimant may be relevant, but are not deterrminative. The ex-
istence of legal cause of stress-related occupational disease
must be determined objectively.1
5
Second, the claimant must prove that employment conditions,
when compared to nonemployment conditions, were the "major contrib-
uting cause" of the mental disorder."0 This standard does not require
that the injury be caused or aggravated solely by work conditions 17 but
ployment," which need not be extreme or unusual); Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796,
799 (Ky. 1976) (holding that recovery is available for nervous breakdown where claim-
ant's pre-existing anxiety neurosis was a dormant nondisabling condition that was
"aroused or brought into disabling reality" by her job as a ticket operator in a garment
factory); Taquino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 So. 2d 625, 626-27 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (La. 1983) (holding that cause of action exists where the
claimant attributes nervous breakdown to employment pressure as long as breakdown is
proven to be causally related to the claimant's employment); Townsend v. Maine Bu-
reau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Me. 1979) (holding that recovery is availa-
ble for mental anxiety resulting from unusual or extraordinary stress or where claimant
can show, "by clear and convincing evidence" that "ordinary and usual work-related
pressures predominated in producing the injury"); Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178
N.J. Super. 571, 585, 429 A.2d 1063, 1071 (1981) (stating that plaintiff can recover if
there is "objective evidence which, when viewed realistically, . . . demonstrate[s] that
the alleged work exposure was to a material degree a contributing factor"); McGarrah
v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 675 P.2d 159, 170 (Or. 1983) (holding that claimant
can recover for mental disability caused by work-related stress if that disability flows
from work conditions that are, in reality, work-related); University of Pittsburgh v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa. Commw. 347, 353, 405 A.2d 1048, 1051
(1979) (holding compensable a suicide that was induced by a work-related mental
breakdown which, according to the medical testimony, was the result of overwork and
anxiety); Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398, 400-01 (W.
Va. 1981) (holding that employee who sustained mental and emotional injuries as a
result of continuous and intentional harassment and humiliation from her supervisor
suffered "compensable personal injury" within meaning of workmen's compensation
act).
12 675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983).
13 Id. at 169.
14 See id. at 169-70.
15 Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
1W Id. at 172.
17 See id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(1)(a) (1981).
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only that the claimant show that the stress at work outweighed the
stress experienced outside work.
Maine has adopted a slightly modified version of the simple
causal-connection rule in its attempt to recognize gradual stressors in
the workplace. In Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety,"8 the
claimant, a police department dispatcher, suffered a nervous breakdown
after being subjected to work-related harassment by her co-workers.
The dispatcher claimed that she was followed, was harassed by annoy-
ing telephone calls, was summoned to court, and was disciplined and
suspended repeatedly and unjustly until she could no longer work."9
While recognizing the needs to protect the employer from fraudulent
claims and to avoid transforming the employer into a health insurer,
the court noted a desire to protect the "average" person and those
predisposed to mental injury. Accordingly, the court adopted a dual test
for identifying compensable mental injuries. When
the mental disability is the gradual result of work-related
stresses, the claimant will have to demonstrate either that he
was subjected to greater pressures and tensions than those
experienced by the average employee or, alternatively, by
clear and convincing evidence show that the ordinary and
usual work-related pressures predominated in producing the
injury.
20
In McGarrah the Oregon court praised this analysis as "reveal[ing] an
underlying methodology to counterbalance the policy problems that em-
anate from the subjective nature of mental injuries by providing an ob-
jective measurement."2
II. CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE
STANDARD
The jurisdictions whose workers' compensation statutes reach
gradual-stress injuries have split over the appropriate legal standard to
apply when dealing with such injuries. Deciding which test is more
appropriate critically affects the disposition of gradual-stress claims.
True gradual stress results from the everyday psychic wear-and-tear of
the job's strains and tensions; by definition it is neither unusual nor
extraordinary. Consequently, a jurisdiction's adoption of the unusual-
"8 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979).
'9 See id. at 1015.
20 Id. at 1020.
21 McGarrah, 675 P.2d at 165.
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stress test would bar many individuals who suffer gradual-stress inju-
ries from receiving workers' compensation benefits, while its adoption
of the objective causal-connection test would, in many cases, allow those
same workers to obtain benefits. 22
In addressing the issue of which test is preferable, one must focus
on two considerations. First, one must take into account the policies
underlying workers' compensation statutes. Second, one must under-
stand the factors that have influenced courts in their approach to grad-
ual-stress claims.
A. The System's Purposes and Scope
States enacted workers' compensation statutes in an attempt to re-
spond to injustices that existed under common law23 and to adapt to the
changes that industrialization had wrought.24 The purpose of a work-
22 See, e.g., Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me.
1979) ("While the [unusual stress test] would be appropriate in the vast majority of
gradual mental injury cases, it would not compensate an individual who, for example,
developed a psychological disability resulting from the simple day-to-day stresses of an
assembly line . . ").
2' Before the enactment of workers' compensation statutes in the nineteenth cen-
tury, common-law principles controlled the ability of workers to recover for injuries
they incurred during the course of their employment. Under the common-law system
the worker carried the burden of establishing the employer's negligence. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 34 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT]. Further, the employer had three
significant defenses: contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assump-
tion of risk. See id.
The Wainwright Commission, appointed by New York Governor Hughes in 1909
to study the question of employer liability, found the old tort system of employer liabil-
ity to be unsatisfactory because "only a small proportion of injured workmen received
substantial compensation, the system was costly and wasteful, it was slow in operation
and it breeded antagonism between employers and employees." NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 6-7 (1957).
These common-law constraints can be attributed to the laissez-faire economic phi-
losophy dominant in the latter part of the nineteenth century. See 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 3, § 4.30. Employers' liability was viewed as an undesirable disincentive to the
capitalist. At the same time, the worker was seen as an independent economic actor
responsible for her own safety and entitled to recover for her work-related injuries only
in cases of negligence. Workers' compensation statutes represented a radical conceptual
departure from this economic vision and a practical response to its unfairness. The
statutes focused on the particular problems presented by the common law approach.
The framers of these statutes sought to eliminate the negligence requirement in order to
broaden recovery. See NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra, at 34.
24 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 2.20; Bernstein, Workmen's Compensation:
Origins, Present Needs and Future Design, in NATIONAL INSTITUTES ON REHABILI-
TATION AND HEALTH SERvICES, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON REHA-
BILITATION AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT].
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ers' compensation system is to provide broad, no-fault coverage to all
victims of all work-related injuries.25 The underlying rationale is one
of risk-spreading and cost distribution: the economic burden of injuries
within the workplace is a part of the cost of production and is therefore
a business expense that should be borne by the employer, who can shift
the cost to the consumer.
26
The system is meant to function as a broad-based, no-fault, 27 in-
come-protection device, the quid pro quo of which is the system's guar-
antee of certain fixed benefits in return for the workers' relinquishment
of the right to seek a higher, although less certain, award in a tort
action. 28 "For the employer, it represents a relatively inexpensive way
to protect himself against the possibility of lawsuits for injuries to his
employees. For the worker, it represents an important segment of his
protection against income loss.
' '29
B. The Evolution of Coverage of Mental Injuries
In approving workers' compensation awards for mental injuries,
the courts extended compensation first in mental-injury cases that re-
sembled physical-injury cases and then in cases involving injuries that
were more purely mental. An examination of this development is help-
ful, for it reveals that the principal factor that has limited the extension
of coverage to mental injuries has been judicial concern that compen-
sated injuries be genuine. This concern explains why some courts have
refused to adopt the objective causal-connection test and have instead
favored the unusual-stress test.
The principal requirements imposed by most state's workers' com-
25 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 1.
26 See id.; Note, Workers' Compensation: Recovery for Psychological Disability
Caused by Work-Related Stress: Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 877, 66
MINN. L. REV. 1194, 1196 (1982); see also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 2.20:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief
in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most
certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-con-
nected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to pro-
vide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the bur-
den of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.
27 What distinguishes the workers' compensation system from other "tort-like"
remedies is the imposition of strict liability. Liability is based solely on the occurrence
of a disabling accident during one's work.
28 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
COMPENDIUM].
29 Larson, Changing Concepts in Workmen's Compensation Coverage, in NA-
TIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 24, at 33.
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pensation statutes are (1) the employee must experience a "personal
injury arising out of and in the course of employment""0 and (2) the
injury must result in a disability entailing either partial or total inca-
pacity to work."' A majority of state statutes also require, or have re-
quired, that the injury be "by accident."32
The fact that much workers' compensation case law evolved dur-
ing a period when most recognized industrial accidents were of a dis-
tinctly physical character, 3 combined with the concrete language of
workers' compensation statutes,34 has slowed judicial approval of bene-
So NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 23, at 32.
3' See id. at 32-33.
1 lB A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 37.10.
8 See Bernstein, Workmen's Compensation: Origins, Present Needs and Future
Design, in NATIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 24, at 4; see also NATIONAL
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 23, at 35 ("The basic principles of the present pro-
gram[s] are largely those established 50 or 60 years ago; they can be completely under-
stood only in the context of forces present at their creation.").
"' The problems presented by judicial efforts to extend statutory coverage to
mental-injury cases can best be seen by examining the "by accident" requirement.
Many jurisdictions have interpreted this phrase to require that, in addition to being
unexpected, an accidental injury must also be traceable to a particular event or cause.
See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 37.20.
The justification for this requirement, which a gradual-stress injury by its very
nature often cannot satisfy, is questionable. The phrase "injury by accident" is taken
directly from English law, which made it quite clear that the requirement "was in-
tended to do little more than deny compensation to those who injured themselves inten-
tionally." COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 30. As Professor Larson notes, there is no
reason, "as a matter of grammar, to read the phrase as if it referred to 'an accident,'
and then proceed to conduct a search for 'the accident.'" 1B A. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 37.20.
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions do just that, and, unfortunately for those with
gradual-stress claims, courts understand an "accident" to be an occurrence in which
some force acts directly upon the physical structure of a worker's body and results in a
readily noticeable injury. See, e.g., Bowman v. National Graphics Corp., 55 Ohio St.
2d 222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 (1978) (holding uncompensable a claimant's back injury that
stemmed from a gradually worsening condition because the injury was not the result of
a sudden mishap). For these courts, such a requirement must take on a new and
strained interpretation in order to extend coverage to a worker traumatized but "un-
hurt" by an explosion, see Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95
A.2d 446, affd per curiam, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604, petition for certification
denied, 13 N.J. 392, 99 A.2d 859 (1953); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va.
204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941), or "burned out" from a burdensome workload, see Barrett
v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Serv., 661 S.W.2d 439 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); University of
Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa. Commw. 347, 405 A.2d
1048 (1979). However, the rule in most jurisdictions today is that the "by accident"
requirement is met if either the cause of the injury was accidental or the injury was the
unexpected result of the routine performance of the worker's duties. See 1B A. LAR-
SON, supra note 3, § 38.00; Note, Emotional Stress-Now a Cause of Compensable
Injury?, 34 LA. L. REV. 846, 847 (1974); Comment, supra note 1, at 1139.
Even if a claimant with a mental injury establishes that the injury was "by acci-
dent," she still must negotiate the "arising out of and in the course of employment"
obstacle. Virtually every state workers' compensation system imposes this requirement
or some variant of it. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 6.00; NATIONAL COMM'N
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fits for workers claiming mental injuries. Courts have had little diffi-
culty approving compensation for workers with mental injuries caused
by physical stimuli or physical injuries caused by mental stimuli, 5 pre-
sumably because such injuries resemble the purely physical injuries to
which the courts were accustomed.
The courts have been more reluctant to allow recovery for mental
injuries allegedly caused by mental stimuli. The pioneer cases in this
area involved sudden frights.3 6 In Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood,
3 7
for example, the claimant was so frightened by an electric flash that she
fainted into the arms of a co-worker. The claimant associated her co-
worker with the frightening experience so that seeing him would cause
her to faint again. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the injury,
which made it impossible for the claimant to work, was compensable.3 8
The key to the case was the sudden stimulus. Although nothing actu-
ally touched the claimant, the explosion satisfied the court's require-
ment of an "accident."3 9
Perhaps the most significant early case was Bailey v. American
REPORT, supra note 23, at 50. This phrase is not free from its own difficulties of
interpretation. The United States Supreme Court has said that this "statutory phrase
• ..is deceptively simple and litigiously prolific." Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947).
The phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of," although combining to deter-
mine "work-connection," focus on different aspects of that standard. See 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 3, § 6.10. The "arising out of" clause requires that the personal injury
arise "out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment." Note,
When Stress Becomes Distress: Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation in
Massachusetts, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 287, 291 (1980). To satisfy this requirement,
the worker must be injured as the result of a risk to which she was exposed as a
consequence of her status as an employee. The "in the course of employment" phrase
requires consideration of the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. See 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 3, § 14.00. "An injury is said to arise in the course of the employ-
ment when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the em-
ployee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing
something incidental thereto." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 14.00.
The potential problems inherent in these dual requirements of work connection
are readily apparent. The nature of psychiatric injuries, especially those caused by
gradual mental stimuli, precludes easy categorization of their cause and existence. Hard
facts of where, when, and how are not likely to be easily proved. Se Comment, supra
note 1, at 1142-44 (arguing that the nature of certain psychoneurotic reactions makes it
impossible to estimate the probability of injury occurring in the absence of employment
and that the causal significance of any one factor is often impossible to determine).
35 See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 42.21-.22 (collecting cases).
36 See Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (sudden
fright caused by explosion of steam pipe), afl'd per curiam, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98
A.2d 604, petition for certification denied, 13 N.J. 392, 99 A.2d 859 (1953); Burling-
ton Mills v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (sudden fright caused by
sound of electrical explosion).
37 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
38 See id. at 211, 13 S.E.2d at 294.
31 See id. at 209-10; 13 S.E.2d at 193.
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General Insurance Co.,40 in which the Texas Supreme Court recog-
nized mental-mental injuries of the sudden type despite the Texas stat-
ute's definition of " 'injury [as] damage or harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body.' "41 The claimant and another worker were on a
scaffold when one end gave way. Although he was caught by the ropes
of the apparatus and was physically unharmed, the claimant saw his
co-worker plunge to his death. Despite attempts to resume work, the
claimant became paralyzed when trying to work at certain heights and
began experiencing other nervous difficulties.42
The court addressed the statutory issue directly, holding that the
worker had indeed suffered damage and harm to his body, even though
the accident itself had left him unscathed. a In exploring the nature of
injury, the court reasoned that the whole man must be examined, not
just the readily observable physical structure. Since the claimant's body
could no longer function as a result of a mishap that he had exper-
ienced at work, the court did not hesitate to extend coverage.44
These cases are typical of the early favorable mental-mental deci-
sions. In all there were sudden, traumatic events that precipitated sub-
sequent injuries, and the courts relied on the occurrence of these events
as indicia of causation.45
In spite of these decisions, courts in a number of jurisdictions have
refused to authorize compensation for mental-mental injuries,46 even
though they have authorized recovery for physical-mental and mental-
40 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
41 Id. at 435, 279 S.W.2d at 318 (citing TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306
§ 20 (Vernon 1925)) (emphasis added by the court).
42 See id. at 432, 279 S.W.2d at 316.
4' The phrase "physical structure of the body," as it is used in the statute,
must refer to the entire body, not simply to the skeletal structure or to the
circulatory system or to the digestive system. It refers to the whole ....
[T]he structure should be considered that of a living person-not as a
static, inanimate thing.
Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
4 See id. at 441-42, 279 S.W.2d at 322.
45 See, e.g., Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913
(1976) (involving claimant who witnessed co-worker's hand being severed by punch
press); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975) (involving claimant who discovered body of supervisor who had
committed suicide).
4' Five jurisdictions-Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, and Oklahoma-still
deny coverage in all mental-mental cases. See Williams v. Hillsborough County School
Bd., 389 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163
Ga. App. 127, 129, 292 S.E.2d 428, 429-30 (1982); Followill v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
234 Kan. 791, 793, 674 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1984); Lockwood v. Independent School
Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1981); Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores,
547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
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physical injuries.47 The courts' concern with the genuineness of claimed
mental disabilities has been one of the major impediments to the exten-
sion of workers' compensation coverage. 48 Professor Larson refers to
this concern as the "how could it be real when . . . it was purely
mental" attitude of many judges:
This equation of "mental" with "unreal," or imaginary, or
phoney, is so ingrained that it has achieved a firm place in
our idiomatic language. Who has not at some time, in dis-
missing a physical complaint of some suffering friend or rel-
ative, airily waved the complaint aside by saying, "Oh, it's
all in his head?"
The impact of this pervasive preconception on compen-
sation decisions can be briefly stated. A high proportion of
the cases display a search for something-anything-that
can be called "physical" to supply the element of "reality" in
the injury. 9
47 See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749, 120 S.E.2d 655
(1961) (reversing lower-court denial of claim for disability of a "psychic nature" when
neurosis arose from a physical injury); Berger v. Hahner, Foreman & Cale, Inc., 211
Kan. 541, 506 P.2d 1175 (1973) (holding compensable a traumatic neurosis that fol-
lowed the loss of an eye); Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 243 Minn. 264, 67
N.W.2d 656 (1954) (holding compensable a traumatic neurosis that resulted from the
cumulative effect of several injuries and corrective surgery); Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc. v. Johnson, 645 P.2d 1051 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (awarding claimant compensa-
tion for post-traumatic depressive neurosis following injury to her nose).
" Larson, supra note 3, at 1243; see, e.g., Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub.
Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979) (requiring "a higher threshold level than
simply the usual and ordinary pressures that exist in any working condition would
erect an appropriate buffer between the employer and a host of malingering claims").
Misplaced paternalism may be another reason why courts have been reluctant to
endorse compensation for mental-mental injuries. In Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham,
163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428 (1982), for instance, the Court of Appeals of Geor-
gia argued that even if the evidentiary problems of causation could be overcome, which
the court greatly doubted, coverage "could make mischief not remotely intended by the
beneficent objectives of [the] Act." Id. at 129, 292 S.E.2d at 430. Mental-mental cover-
age, it was hypothesized, would hamstring employers who want to fire or even to disci-
pline their employees, "for fear of inciting or stimulating a nervous, mental or emo-
tional disorder." Id.Moreover, employers would with good reason hesitate or refrain
from hiring persons with histories of "shell-shock," psychiatric treatment, or even psy-
chological counseling, for fear of being unable to discipline that employee or expose her
to the vicissitudes of life, and for fear of being stuck with that employee's "life burden."
Id.
A common rationale is lack of legislative guidance. See, e.g., Followill v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 234 Kan. 791, 795, 674 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1984) (recognizing that legislature
had recently amended statute but arguing that definitions of "personal injury" and
"injury" remained unchanged); Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 877, 312
N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. 1981) (noting that statute's 1953 amendment revealed no
legislative intent to compensate such claims).
49 Larson, supra note 3, at 1243.
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The way in which courts extended coverage to psychological mala-
dies indicates that the courts were less concerned with making princi-
pled determinations of the kinds of injuries that should be compensable
and were more concerned with questions of proof.5 0 Sudden-stimulus
cases so sufficiently resembled physical-accident cases that courts were
able to analogize the two.51 The burden of sidestepping statutory lan-
guage was heavy enough, and the courts that did so limited their liberal
interpretation of the statutes to "safe" cases. For example, it would
matter little to a court that a blinding flash of light flared fifteen feet
away from a worker or that a ten-ton weight that fell from a great
height narrowly missed. What would count to the court was the fact
that such events actually occurred; the event's evidentiary value in prov-
ing causation reassured courts that the injuries were genuine and work-
related.
III. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
Having reviewed the policies supporting workers' compensation
schemes as well as the evolution of judicial treatment of mental-injury
claims, we can now determine which test-the unusual-stress test or
the objective causal-connection test-is more appropriate. A test requir-
ing that a simple causal connection be established between the alleged
gradual stressors objectively existing in the workplace and the alleged
mental illness is the best method for identifying injuries that should be
compensated. Two arguments support this conclusion: (1) only the ob-
jective causal-connection test adequately advances the policies underly-
ing workers' compensation and (2) the unusual-stress test is premised
on a misguided view of causation.
A. Workers' Compensation Policy
The first policy consideration weighing in favor of the objective
causal-connection test and against the unusual-stress test is that the lat-
ter violates the fundamental premise in workers' compensation law that
the employer takes the employee as she finds her.52 Generally, workers'
50 See Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REv. 263, 289-96
(1983).
51 See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.21; Joseph, supra note 50, at 287.
51 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 12.20; see Kelly's Case, 462 N.E.2d 348, 350
(Mass. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that "employer must take the worker as is with existing
disabilities"), affd, No. S-3591 (Mass. May 6, 1985); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laun-
dry, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 55-56, 95 A.2d 446, 448, affd per curiam, 26 N.J.
Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (1953) ("[Ilnherent perplexities [of the claimant] cannot be
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compensation law protects the "eggshell skull" plaintiff-a worker who
is more predisposed to injury than the average worker.
Yet judicial requirements that a worker prove she was exposed to
some sort of unusual or extraordinary stress do deny benefits to those
who are predisposed to mental injury. A comparison of rulings using
the causal-connection test and the unusual-stress test demonstrates this.
State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Shilling," decided by the Or-
egon Court of Appeals, and Sloss v. Industrial Commission," an Ari-
zona case, each involved a worker who had succumbed to the continual
stress and strain of a demanding job. The Arizona court denied a high-
way patrolman's request for compensation, arguing that the claimant
experienced what was only "the usual ordinary and expected incidents
of his job."155 Faced with a similar claim by a motor vehicle department
office worker, the Oregon court awarded compensation.56 The court ac-
knowledged that the claimant may have been more susceptible to the
working conditions than others might have been,5 7 but it based its deci-
sion squarely on the fact that she had incurred a true work-related
mental injury: "The question is not whether claimant's perception of
overwork was accurate or whether claimant was overworked as judged
by a standard of what would constitute overwork to the average person
on her job. The question is whether there were stress-causing pressures
on her job that were 'real.' "58
The Shilling decision is more consistent with the workers' com-
pensation goal of coverage for all workers. The stressful work environ-
ment is analogous to a slippery floor, for it is just as capable of injuring
those unlucky enough to be ill-suited to the situation. A worker predis-
posed to mental reactions to stress should not be denied recovery any
more than a worker predisposed to certain physical injuries, and the
fact that an average worker might not experience any ill effects from
such stress should be irrelevant. As the New York Court of Appeals
has suggested,
[Tihere is nothing in the nature of a stress or shock situation
which ordains physical as opposed to psychological injury.
The determinative factor is the particular vulnerability of an
individual by virtue of his physical make up. In a given situ-
permitted to defeat an award where the requisite standards of proof have otherwise
been met.").
" 66 Or. App. 600, 675 P.2d 1081 (1984).
" 121 Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1978).
55 Id. at 12, 588 P.2d at 305.
56 See Shilling, 675 P.2d at 1085.
a See id. at 1081.
58 Id. at 1084.
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ation one person may be susceptible to a heart attack while
another may suffer a depressive reaction. In either case the
result is the same-the individual is incapable of functioning
properly because of an accident and should be compensated
under the Workmen's Compensation Law.59
The second policy consideration favoring the objective causation
test arises from the system's objective of offering unqualified protection
to workers who suffer any kind of incapacitating injuries during the
course of employment. All work-related injuries, whether mental or
physical, should be redressed. 0 Seen in this light, the causal-connection
test is a better measure. While the unusual-stress test often will bar
recovery by workers with genuine work-related disabilities-gradual-
stress injuries, for example-the objective causal-connection test, by
making compensation possible for many of these claimants, better com-
ports with the goal of universal coverage. As the Hawaii Supreme
Court concluded in Royal State National Insurance Co. v. Labor &
Industrial Relations Appeal Board,"
In today's highly competitive world it cannot be doubted that
people often succumb to mental pressures resulting from
their employment. These disabilities are as much a cost of
the production process as physical injuries. The humanita-
rian purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law require
that indemnification be predicated not upon the label as-
signed to the injury received, but upon the employee's inabil-
ity to work because of impairments flowing from the condi-
tions of his employment.6 2
The important question under workers' compensation law should
be whether the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of em-
ployment. If such a connection exists, benefits should be awarded.63 To
" Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603,
606, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975).
60 Indeed, most commentators agree that psychiatric theory does not support the
legal distinction between "physical" injuries and "mental" injuries. See, e.g., 1B A.
LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.23(a); Comment, supra note 1, at 1137.
6' 53 Hawaii 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971).
62 Id. at 38, 487 P.2d at 282 (footnote and citations omitted).
" Systems that limit compensation to cases in which employees experience trau-
matic or extraordinary events may encourage employees to create such events:Use of the
time and place distinction suggests a judicial belief that mental disability may legiti-
mately follow some traumatic shock but is imagined or faked in its absence. However,
this practice may compound the incentive problem it is designed to combat. A worker
who can be compensated only in the case of a traumatic event has an incentive to
provide one; insistence on time and place documentation may well encourage more
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operate in an unbiased manner, the workers' compensation system must
serve as a potential source of protection for all workers, regardless of
the manner in which their injuries develop.
64
B. Causation and Legitimacy
The search for an objective measure of an inherently subjective
injury is at the heart of the problem surrounding the compensation of
gradual-stress injuries. A serious shortcoming of the unusual-stress test
is that it is predicated on the fallacious belief that the existence of ex-
traordinary or unusual events assures that subsequent mental injuries
are genuine and work-related and on the converse belief that the ab-
sence of such events indicates that the alleged injuries are not genuine
or work-related.
Judicial reliance on tangibility as one of the indicia of an injury's
genuineness is misguided.65 As one commentator has noted, "The exis-
tence of a mental impact stimulus on unusual excessive mental employ-
ment stresses . . . does not medically assure the genuineness of the
causal relation between a worker's mental disability and his employ-
ment any more than does the existence of a physical impact."'66 And,
although the concern over fraudulent claims is valid,67 professionals
may be able to detect certain feigned psychoneurotic reactions more eas-
ily than some more commonly feigned physical injuries.6 8
accidents.
Staten & Umbeck, Compensating Stress-Induced Disability: Incentive Problems, in
SAFETY AND THE WORK FORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES IN WORKERS'
COMPENSATION 103, 107 (J. Worrall ed. 1983).
64 Cases in Minnesota demonstrate the injustice of compensating workers for
physical injuries caused by mental stimuli while not compensating them for mental
injuries caused by mental stimuli. In Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 877,
312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981), a high school principal was mentally disabled by the
constant pressures of his job and was forced to take a permanent medical leave of
absence. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied him disability benefits, explaining that
mental illnesses caused by job stresses without physical trauma are not compensable
under Minnesota law. See id. at 926-27. Yet, had stress caused the principal to suffer a
fatal heart attack while at work or motivated him to kill himself while on a school
outing, he would have been covered by the law. See Aker v. State, 282 N.W.2d 533
(Minn. 1979) (holding compensable a heart attack caused by mental stress); see also
Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1984) (stating that a stress-
induced ulcer is compensable; stress-caused depression is not).
85 Surprisingly, Professor Larson has recommended Wisconsin's unusual-stress
requirement as the most straightforward means of determining whether a gradual-
stress injury satisfies the normal "arising out of employment" inquiry. See 1B A. LAR-
SON, supra note 3, §§ 38.81, 42.23(b).
"8 Joseph, supra note 50, at 305; see Comment, supra note 1, at 1137-38.
67 See Lasky, Psychiatry and California Workers' Compensation Laws: A Threat
and a Challenge, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 1 (1980).
68 See Comment, supra note 1, at 1137.
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Similarly, although the relationship between a mental illness and
the workplace can be tenuous, it is not entirely clear that the presence
of a physical, as opposed to a mental, stimulus does anything more to
guarantee that there is a causal connection between the injury and the
employment. Since a physical stimulus is no more likely to trigger a
psychoneurotic reaction than a mental stimulus,6 9 insistence on the
presence of a physical stimulus is of little use to courts that are prop-
erly concerned about the legitimacy of claimed injuries.
Admittedly, identifying the source of mental illness can be, at best,
a difficult task.1 0 However, requiring a claimant to prove that the stress
that caused her mental breakdown was unusual is a clumsy means by
which to prove causation. The levels of stress in occupations vary,71 and
to require a worker in a highly stressful occupation to prove that she
was subject to unusual stress may be unfair, particularly when the
amount of stress normally present in her work is clearly sufficient to
cause mental trauma. Similarly, the worker in a low-stress profession
may find the unusual-stress standard easy to meet, even though as an
objective matter the level of such unusual stress may be less than an
employee in another occupation might usually suffer.
The objective causal-connection test is superior for handling grad-
ual-stress claims, for it assures that all work-related injuries are re-
dressed and, if properly administered, limits compensation to legitimate
claims. Undoubtedly some claimants will attempt to recover for feigned
mental injuries or mental injuries unrelated to work, but it is preferable
to adopt a broad rule and administer it closely than to allow the fear of
overcoverage to compromise the workers' compensation system as a
whole. As one commentator has noted,
[O]nce a causal nexus is established between the injury and
the trauma, ancient notions of personal injury should be
abandoned and replaced by the modern doctrine which
merely requires industry to pay for the ills it causes. If a
causal connection is shown, there is no logical basis to deny
compensation to a claimant who would be otherwise men-
tally sound, but for his employment . ... .7
Finally, states that employ the causal-connection test can guard
against fraudulent claims by adopting evidentiary safeguards. Pennsyl-
69 See id..
7 See Joseph, supra note 50, at 271-73; Comment, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
71 See C. COOPER & J. MARSHALL, WHITE COLLAR AND PROFESSIONAL STRESS
(Wiley Series on Studies in Occupational Stress 1980) (surveying stress in various
white-collar occupations).
71 Note, supra note 34, at 304 (footnote omitted).
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vania, for instance, requires that, because of the highly subjective na-
ture of psychological injuries, where "there is no obvious causal rela-
tionship between a claimant's work and his injury, he must present
unequivocal medical testimony to establish the causal connection."73
And claimants in New Jersey must offer objective evidence that forces
in the workplace were to a material degree factors contributing to the
mental illness. The injury "'must be due in some realistic sense and
material degree to a risk reasonably incidental to the employment; the
[onset] must issue from or be contributed to by conditions which bear
some essential relation to the work or its nature.' "7
CONCLUSION
A worker's allegation that her job has caused a disabling mental
illness is troublesome, whether it is alleged that the disability was
caused by a physical accident, a sudden mental stimulus, or a gradual
mental stimulus. Advances in medical knowledge have revealed that the
workplace is a significant source of mental injuries, yet many jurisdic-
tions have been slow to extend workers' compensation to workers who
suffer these injuries, particularly to those workers who incur gradual-
stress injuries. Of the two tests relied upon by jurisdictions that allow
compensation for gradual-stress injuries, the objective causation test is
more appropriate. It is more consistent with the policies underlying
workers' compensation schemes, and it does not incorporate the faulty
event-causation bias implicit in the unusual-stress test.
The treatment of mental disorders by workers' compensation law
has undergone several phases in its evolution. The adoption of the sim-
ple causal-connection test should be the next stage in that evolutionary
process.
7' Kitchen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 73 Pa. Commw. 289, 294,
458 A.2d 631, 634 (1983).
7, See Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 585, 429 A.2d 1063,
1071 (1981).
15 Id. at 585, 429 A.2d at 1070 (quoting Walck v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
56 N.J. 533, 556, 267 A.2d 508, 521 (1970)). Courts fearful of an onslaught of fraudu-
lent claims might, do well to listen to Professor Larson's reassurance in a related area:
If any court is disposed to worry about whether abandoning the unusual-exertion inter-
pretation . . . would "open the floodgates," it might find reassurance in the fact that
getting an . . .award in [states that have eliminated this requirement] is no "push-
over." The difference is that the battle is avowedly fought out on the fundamental
causation issue.
1B A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 38.83.
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